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### Report on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

#### Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

## Programme evaluation of the performance and the achievement of results by the United Nations Mission in Liberia

### Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services\*

*“UNMIL has achieved substantial progress in implementing its mandate, but weak implementation of reform in the security sector poses a risk to sustained peace and security in Liberia”*

#### *Summary*

The present report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) is the result of its programme evaluation of the performance and the accomplishment of results by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The objective of the evaluation was to determine the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness (including the impact) of UNMIL in relation to its mandated objectives. The purpose of the report is to enable the Secretariat and Member States to engage in systematic reflection with a view to increasing the effectiveness of UNMIL. OIOS utilized a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods in the conduct of the evaluation, including in-depth interviews with representatives of the Government of Liberia, Mission management and staff, the United Nations country team, external stakeholders, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support; surveys of the Liberian population, including ex-combatants, and UNMIL staff; and the structured review of United Nations documents.

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\* The compilation and analysis of data, including the local population survey, required to provide the most current and pertinent information delayed the submission of the present report.



OIOS found that, while substantial progress has been made towards the fulfilment of the Mission's mandate, serious challenges remain. The Office found that, among the local population, UNMIL is regarded as having a high level of legitimacy and is a source of confidence as a security provider. The population views UNMIL as playing an essential role in supporting the current peace, in particular by enabling the armed forces to disarm and by providing civilians with a sense of security. Together with the maintenance of the ceasefire, noticeable achievements have been accomplished in programmatic areas such as disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation and the holding of democratic elections, greatly contributing to a stable and peaceful Liberia.

However, there has been limited progress and important challenges remain in relation to reform of the security sector and judicial and corrections institutions — areas that are more dependent on the development of national strategies and on the funding and resources provided by donors. The lack of an overarching strategy for security sector reform is a critical issue that puts at risk the sustainability of peace and security, as well as the Mission's achievements. In addition, the fact that the accomplishments in those areas have been limited has affected the ability of UNMIL to fulfil other aspects of its mandate, such as the promotion of human rights.

In its work with the United Nations country team, UNMIL has established a model field coordination structure, facilitating a "One United Nations" approach in Liberia. They have also established an integrated strategic planning framework through which the Mission and the country team work together in partnership to assist the host country.

The present report contains 12 recommendations to help improve the Mission's performance and promote the achievement of results. These include recommendations to:

- (a) Develop an overarching strategy for security sector reform;
- (b) Strengthen the support provided to the Liberian National Police, through a range of measures;
- (c) Intensify dialogue with the Government of Liberia on national legal reform and reform of the judicial sector;
- (d) Align exit strategies with a security needs assessment in order to avoid the creation of a security vacuum as the Mission downsizes;
- (e) Overcome the administrative challenges hampering further integration of the Mission with the country team.

A draft version of the present report was reviewed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and UNMIL, and specific comments resulting from the review have been incorporated throughout the report in italics. OIOS greatly appreciates the cooperation and assistance extended to it by the departments and UNMIL during the course of the evaluation.

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## I. Introduction

1. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) undertook a programme evaluation of the performance and the achievement of results by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in accordance with its mandate.<sup>1</sup>

2. The purpose of the programme evaluation was to determine the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness (including the impact) of UNMIL in relation to its mandated objectives. The evaluation focused on the progress made towards the fulfilment of the mandates and operational objectives of the Mission, the relevance of the mandates, activities and outputs in the context of the current political situation, the efficiency with which outputs were delivered, the validity of strategies and partnership arrangements, and the identification of good practices and lessons learned that can inform other peacekeeping missions.

## II. Methodology

3. OIOS used a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods in the conduct of the evaluation, including the following data sources:

(a) A self-administered survey of international and national staff of UNMIL, United Nations Volunteers and senior military and United Nations police staff;

(b) In-depth interviews with Mission senior management, section chiefs and staff;

(c) In-depth interviews with representatives of the Government of Liberia and with Liberian county officials;

(d) In-depth interviews with Headquarters staff from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support;

(e) Interviews with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes that form the United Nations country team in Liberia;

(f) In-depth interviews with external stakeholders;

(g) A structured review of United Nations documents, including reports of the Secretary-General, budget and performance reports and the reports of technical assessment missions.

4. In addition, a survey of the population of Liberia was undertaken during the winter of 2009 to gauge the perceptions of both ordinary civilians and former combatants regarding the impact of UNMIL operations. The survey was not designed to represent the views of the Liberian population in general; rather, it focused purposively on communities that either (a) received UNMIL deployments or (b) did not receive deployments, but resembled recipient communities in terms of socio-economic conditions and geography. The objective was to provide a basis for assessing the impact of UNMIL by comparing recipient and non-recipient communities. The evaluation attempted to test the hypothesis that peacekeeping deployments have local impacts that include laying the groundwork for social,

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<sup>1</sup> See General Assembly resolutions 48/218B, 54/244 and 59/272, ST/SGB/2002/7 and Article 97 of the Charter of the United Nations.

economic and political transformation that can lead to sustainable peace. The sample comprised 2,000 individuals aged 15 years or older, with 1,295 respondents (1,020 civilians and 275 ex-combatants).

5. OIOS also made use of the services of an advisory panel composed of internationally recognized researchers and experts in the peace and conflict arena, who provided feedback and comments regarding the draft report.

6. OIOS notes the following limitations of the evaluation:

(a) The overall rate of response to the self-administered survey sent to all international and national staff of UNMIL, as well as United Nations Volunteers, was 26 per cent. While that is close to the norm for United Nations staff surveys, the conclusions cannot be considered representative. Nevertheless, they constitute the best information available;

(b) Respondents returning a self-administered survey may represent extremes among the population;

(c) Survey findings are biased significantly towards the opinions of international staff, as the response rate of international staff was 45 per cent (238 responses out of a possible 522), as compared with only 15 per cent of national staff (159 responses out of a possible 1,050);

(d) There was a reliance on secondary data in the assessment of areas for which it was not possible to collect primary data.

7. A draft version of the present report was reviewed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and UNMIL, and specific comments resulting from the review have been incorporated throughout the report in italics, as appropriate. OIOS greatly appreciates the cooperation and assistance extended by the departments and by the senior leadership and staff of UNMIL during the course of the evaluation.

### **III. Background**

8. The conflict in Liberia began in 1989 with armed confrontations between Government forces and the armed opposition group of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Arbitrary rule and economic collapse had culminated in civil war by the late 1980s, when the NPFL militia overran much of the countryside, entering the capital in 1990. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed its Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 to intervene in the civil war. After ECOWAS had succeeded in brokering a peace agreement for Liberia in 1993, the United Nations established the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to support ECOMOG in implementing the peace agreement. UNOMIL was withdrawn at the end of 1997 as Charles Taylor, the leader of NPFL, was elected President of Liberia, and the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) was established.

9. Despite the peacebuilding efforts, the civil war resumed and was intensified in 2003, involving Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the Government of Liberia. In August 2003, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in Accra. It called for the establishment of a National Transitional Government of Liberia in October the

same year. It also requested that a United Nations stabilization force, with peace enforcement capabilities mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, be deployed to Liberia to assist the Transitional Government, to help keep the peace and to aid the country in holding elections for a new national Government in 2005.

10. UNMIL was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1509 (2003), after the Council had determined that the situation in Liberia posed a threat to international peace and security in the region. The Council authorized UNMIL to operate under Chapter VII of the Charter, and the Mission was provided with 15,000 military personnel and some 1,115 United Nations police, including formed police units. The total budget allocated to UNMIL since its establishment amounts to just under \$4.7 billion. The current substantive mandated activities of the Mission, as stipulated in resolution 1509 (2003) and further developed by the Council in its resolutions 1638 (2005) and 1750 (2007), as well as its resolution 1885 (2009), by which it extended the Mission's mandate until 30 September 2010, include:

- (a) Support for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement;
- (b) The protection of United Nations staff, facilities and civilians;
- (c) Support for humanitarian and human rights assistance;
- (d) Support for security sector reform;
- (e) Support for the implementation of the peace process;
- (f) Assisting the Government of Liberia with the 2011 elections.

#### **IV. Findings of the evaluation**

11. The programme evaluation assessed the mission's performance in all the aforementioned mandated areas, and the findings are presented accordingly.

##### **A. Support for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement**

###### **1. UNMIL has contributed effectively to the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, but faces challenges in the work of reintegration and rehabilitation**

12. The Mission's ceasefire mandate included monitoring the ceasefire and the disengagement of all forces, investigating violations and supporting the work of the Joint Monitoring Committee. The mandate also included developing a strategy for the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation of ex-combatants, implementing the disarmament and demobilization programme, and collecting and destroying weapons and ammunition. In addition, the mandate required UNMIL to secure key Government installations and infrastructure.

13. OIOS noted the successful completion of the critical ceasefire component of the Mission's objectives upon its deployment, when the capital, Monrovia, was swiftly secured. A documentation review showed that the ceasefire had generally continued to hold, no severe security violations had been recorded and no major

incidents of battle-related violence had occurred.<sup>2</sup> This was further evidenced by the finding of the population survey that UNMIL is regarded as highly legitimate as a security provider within the Liberian population. Nearly all (97 per cent) respondents stated that UNMIL had helped to end the war, and 78 per cent noted that they were confident that UNMIL was capable of preventing fighting among armed groups. Ninety-three per cent of respondents felt safer after the Mission's deployment than they had felt before it.

14. With regard to disarmament and the collection of weapons, OIOS noted that substantial progress has been achieved. By the end of 2004, UNMIL had been successful in disarming and demobilizing 101,495 combatants and had collected and destroyed some 28,000 weapons, 34,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance and 6.5 million rounds of small arms ammunition. The disarmament and demobilization process was considered largely completed and successful. That has been corroborated by the findings of a multi-donor review undertaken by the United Nations Development Programme as an external midterm evaluation in October 2006.

15. The OIOS population survey found that the Mission's provision of security was an important factor in that success; the majority (85 per cent) of ex-combatants at regrouping sites did not fear attack from opposing factions while under the Mission's protection, and most (72 per cent) did not fear that surrendered weapons would be stolen by opposing forces. UNMIL has since continued to collect and destroy residual weapons and ammunition voluntarily surrendered or discovered through search operations. By August 2007, this ongoing effort had resulted in the collection of an additional 748 weapons, 1,390 pieces of unexploded ordnance and 99,980 rounds of ammunition.

16. OIOS noted that the Mission faced greater challenges in the implementation of the reintegration and rehabilitation components of the programme, which officially closed only in mid-2009. The OIOS survey of ex-combatants found that less than half (37 per cent) had registered for benefits, that most (85 per cent) of those individuals had chosen only vocational training, and that only half of that number had completed their training.

17. In terms of social reintegration, a positive finding of the OIOS survey was that a large majority (77 per cent) of ex-combatant respondents spent most of their time with "family and friends", as opposed to "friends from faction" (12 per cent). The population survey found that the percentage of households earning more than LRD 4,500 (just under \$2 a day) was higher in communities where troops were deployed than in communities distant from deployments. However, the survey's findings on the impact of the Mission's quick-impact projects and employment projects did not show that the projects had had significant economic benefits for the recipient communities.

18. *On the issue of quick-impact projects, UNMIL commented that the goals of such projects are not necessarily economic and that recent projects are aimed at strengthening the rule-of-law sector and consolidating State authority, for example. Regarding employment projects, UNMIL provided additional information indicating that between 2006 and 2010, emergency employment interventions resulted in the*

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<sup>2</sup> E. Mvukiyehe and C. Samii, "Quantitative Impact Evaluation of the United Nations Mission in Liberia: final report" (working draft 1.0), 18 January 2010.

*creation of more than 75,000 short-term jobs (equalling 2.3 million workdays) and the injection of more than \$6 million into Liberia's most vulnerable communities. UNMIL further stated that an impact assessment was carried out in 2008 by the Liberia Institute of Public Administration, with positive findings.*

## **B. Protection of United Nations staff and facilities, and civilians**

### **2. UNMIL has been effective for the most part in the protection of United Nations staff and facilities, and civilians**

19. An important element of the mandate of UNMIL is the task of protecting United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, as well as ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its personnel. The mandate also authorizes the Mission to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and without prejudice to the efforts of the Government. Liberia is currently under security phase three, and incidents of armed violence are recurrent throughout the country.

20. OIOS noted that attacks on United Nations personnel and property have been caused mainly by disgruntled former United Nations employees and that incidents of crime such as robberies are now perceived to be the greatest single direct threat both to the Liberian population and to United Nations personnel and property. This includes thefts, robberies, residential break-ins and acts of harassment. The Office found that UNMIL staff in general (91 per cent) regard the implementation of the protection mandate as satisfactory or better, with only 7 per cent considering it to be poor or very poor. Staff perceptions aside, there is insufficient information to evaluate the actual performance of UNMIL on the basis of quantitative evidence.

21. *Regarding the aforementioned issue, UNMIL has commented that, as a result of the efforts of the Security Information and Coordination Unit, the Security Section has a complete quantitative record of all security-related incidents, as reflected in the biweekly security management team statistics and the biannual security risk assessments. The analysis of security threats is regularly monitored and also reflected in security risk assessments, as well as in the risk matrix.*

22. With regard to civilian protection, the results of the population survey indicated that the efforts of UNMIL to protect civilians are positively assessed by the Liberian population, with 78 per cent of respondents stating that they were confident in the Mission's ability to protect civilians. When asked to list whom they would turn to if they faced insecurity as a result of armed groups, approximately 88 per cent mentioned UNMIL as an essential security provider. Of these respondents, approximately one third indicated that they considered UNMIL to be their sole security provider. In addition, most people surveyed regarded UNMIL as being respectful of the local population, with only 7 per cent indicating that UNMIL never or rarely treated people with dignity and respect. In general, there is widespread approval of UNMIL among the Liberian population, most of which is very appreciative of the Mission's presence and sees no reason for a hasty withdrawal.

## C. Support for humanitarian and human rights assistance

### 3. The Mission's performance in its support for humanitarian and human rights assistance has been mixed

23. The mandate of UNMIL includes facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance and contributing to the protection and promotion of human rights, in particular those of the members of vulnerable groups, such as refugees, internally displaced persons, women, children and demobilized child soldiers. OIOS notes that progress concerning the advancement of humanitarian and human rights assistance in Liberia has been mixed.

24. With regard to the facilitation of humanitarian assistance, UNMIL reports progress in the improvement of humanitarian conditions, such as access to food, water and shelter, among the most basic conditions, made possible by the drastic improvements in the security situation throughout the country, even though programmes have been constrained by poor infrastructure. In addition, UNMIL has previously supported the delivery of humanitarian assistance through the coordination of security and logistics support for humanitarian access. These activities had contributed to the return of some 160,000 refugees by the beginning of 2008 and of more than 270,000 internally displaced persons by 2006. The staff survey found that nearly all UNMIL staff are satisfied with the Mission's support for humanitarian assistance activities.

25. However, while UNMIL is regarded among the local population as having a great deal of legitimacy as a security provider, it is not recognized as playing a major role in humanitarian activities. When asked what humanitarian activities UNMIL had engaged in regularly in their communities, 41 per cent of respondents indicated "none". Given the Mission's mandate only to facilitate — not carry out — humanitarian assistance, that response may reflect unmet or false expectations regarding its role in the provision of such assistance, or could just indicate the inability of respondents to differentiate between the humanitarian assistance provided by United Nations humanitarian agencies and that facilitated by the Mission.

26. OIOS found that UNMIL has been unique in terms of its integration of humanitarian actors with their political and military counterparts; such actors are often kept separate for reasons of neutrality and security. OIOS learned that the Liberian office of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs was integrated into UNMIL in 2004 through the creation of a Humanitarian Coordination Section/Support Office within the Mission's organizational structure. This was done to facilitate a fully integrated response to the humanitarian situation in the country. OIOS observed that, as a result, the issue of humanitarian space, often problematic in other missions, seems to be of little concern to the United Nations in Liberia.<sup>3</sup> However, OIOS noted from interviews that there remain perceptions that the Liberian office of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs might have been more effective if it had not been fully integrated into UNMIL. OIOS has no basis on which to confirm that perception and encourages the Department of

<sup>3</sup> The need for "humanitarian space" is the stated need of humanitarian organizations to separate their activities from those of political or military actors so as to preserve their neutrality. The purpose of ensuring such space is to avoid politicizing aid and making humanitarian actors seem partial to either side of a conflict.

Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to undertake a joint study on the effectiveness of its integrated approach.

27. With regard to the promotion of human rights, UNMIL is working with the Government of Liberia to develop a human rights framework and is assisting in the development of crucial State institutions and mechanisms required for the efficient protection of human rights. In addition, the Mission contributes, directly and indirectly, through a range of implementation programmes — for example, by using quick-impact projects to build courts and prisons. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was launched in 2006 and has been supported by UNMIL through a nationwide multimedia campaign promoting and publicizing the proceedings of the Commission. The Mission has also conducted national awareness-raising campaigns on human rights issues, including sexual and gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS.

28. The population survey examined whether activities in the vicinity of peacekeepers may have improved public awareness of the transitional justice processes and generated demands for such processes; 44 per cent of respondents indicated that they had heard something or a great deal about the national Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The survey also examined attitudes towards gender equality, finding that up to 71 per cent agreed that women should have equal rights and more than 60 per cent agreed that women have the right to hold public office.

29. The staff survey data indicated that a vast majority of staff consider the Mission's support for human rights activities to be satisfactory or better, with only 6 per cent regarding it as poor or very poor. Nonetheless, the data indicated a much greater degree of dissatisfaction among staff working within sections, such as Legal Affairs, more directly related to important areas involving human rights issues. In addition, staff interviews indicated that delays in recruiting UNMIL staff have affected the Mission's ability to support the promotion and protection of human rights. Other factors, external to the Mission, include the continuing delay in the launch of the Independent National Commission on Human Rights.

## **D. Support for security sector reform**

### **4 (a). UNMIL faces serious challenges in its support for security sector reform**

30. The security sector reform mandate of UNMIL includes two components: assisting the Government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the Liberian National Police, and assisting the Government in forming a new and restructured Armed Forces of Liberia. OIOS noted that some progress has been achieved in restructuring the Liberian security forces since the deployment of UNMIL, particularly in the vetting and training of 3,500 police and 2,000 military troops. Nonetheless, analysis carried out by the United Nations and independent actors assessed the police as having remained largely ineffectual. According to the staff survey, the implementation of the security sector reform mandate was considered to be least satisfactory by 67 per cent of respondents. When asked about the likelihood of the mandated areas being fully implemented shortly after the 2011 elections, staff expressed the least confidence that the security sector reform mandate would be fulfilled, with 25 per cent of respondents indicating that it was as unlikely or highly unlikely.

31. In interviews with senior UNMIL staff, OIOS found that the Mission's role in supporting the Armed Forces of Liberia has not been clearly defined. Accordingly, the Mission's input to the development of the Armed Forces of Liberia has remained limited. OIOS noted that, given its current structure, the Armed Forces of Liberia will not be able to act as — nor was it intended to be — a replacement for the Mission. It remains uncertain whether the Liberian security sector will be able to sustain security once UNMIL has withdrawn. Furthermore, OIOS took note of the assessment carried out in the context of the 2007 report of the RAND Corporation entitled "Making Liberia safe: transformation of the national security sector", which informed the draft national security strategy currently under consideration. As indicated in that assessment, the Liberian National Police and the Armed Forces of Liberia may prove inadequate to satisfy the security needs of Liberia. The report calls for an evaluation of the country's security environment and its concept of how to address the challenges. A proper security assessment needs to be undertaken by UNMIL, in conjunction with ECOWAS and the Government of Liberia, before an exit strategy for the Mission can be fully developed. The assessment should include an evaluation of potential threats to the country's security so that appropriate and risk-aware decisions can be made regarding how and when UNMIL will withdraw and what security institutions will replace it.

32. Notable Mission achievements under the Liberian National Police mandate have included the restoration of the National Police Training Academy, facilitated by UNMIL through the partnership and bilateral support of several donors; UNDP projects with the Liberian National Police and United Nations police; and the subsequent basic training provided to 3,500 Liberian National Police officers, which was completed on schedule in 2007. Another important achievement has been the successful training of 1,800 Liberian National Police officers by the time of the 2005 elections. From a police perspective, the development of the Liberian National Police is on track, but the slow pace of the progress being made in other pillars, such as corrections, immigration and the judiciary, is negatively affecting the work of the Liberian police. Nonetheless, OIOS noted the substantial achievement accomplished by UNMIL and the Government of Liberia in having developed a Liberian National Police strategic plan outlining a road map and partnership needs, which has attracted the positive attention of donors.

33. OIOS found that the deficiencies affecting the Liberian National Police are also partly a consequence of shortcomings in the training and mentoring provided by UNMIL. The Mission currently provides guidance and specialized training at the Academy in such areas as investigations, collecting evidence, forensics, strategic planning and management. While OIOS noted that the number and the composition of United Nations police staff are sufficient to provide basic training to the Liberian National Police, the Mission lacks many of the specialized advisory capacities needed to appropriately provide the specialized training required in the current, advanced stages of Liberian National Police development. The majority of stakeholders interviewed on the subject stated that they considered it important that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations increase its collaboration with police-contributing countries to make such capacities available to UNMIL. That finding is supported by an independent review. In addition to specialist police, necessary requirements include civilian advisory capacity, currently lacking in such areas as logistical support management, accountancy and audit, to support the operationalization of the Liberian National Police.

34. OIOS noted that the Liberian National Police lacks a functional leadership training system. UNMIL has been able to provide two management courses for officers at the senior and middle levels, and two additional courses have been provided by Member States. However, 50 per cent of the 115 senior officers have not attended a senior management course, and approximately 65 per cent of middle managers have not attended a middle-management course. OIOS has been informed that, while attention has been focused mainly on training the target number of 3,500 general and specialized officers of the Liberian National Police, the focus should now shift to the qualitative aspects of the training, including command and control structures that will ensure a better-functioning force.

35. OIOS has learned from interviews that the United Nations police advisory system could be improved and that senior advisers are not available for all Liberian National Police senior staff key positions. From interviews with experienced United Nations police officers, the Office has concluded that it would be useful to appoint United Nations police senior advisers for at least the deputy commissioners for operations, crime services and administration and the chief of staff. Senior advisory teams are also needed for other Liberian National Police senior officers in key positions in such areas as personnel, budgeting, maintenance, operational planning, investigations and intelligence. It is important that the United Nations police try to adopt a new structure, similar to that of the Liberian National Police, to ensure the availability of such an advisory capacity, and that the new structure be reflected in the standard operating procedures for wider adaptation.

36. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that, despite numerous appeals, police-contributing countries have not provided the experienced senior police personnel required in many identified priority areas.*

**4 (b). UNMIL lacks an overarching strategic framework for the coordination of security sector reform**

37. There is no overarching strategic framework for security sector reform in Liberia, nor is there an integrated plan for the various mission components that are separately addressing areas of such reform. The ability of the Government to sustain the peace and stability that has been created by the presence of UNMIL will depend greatly on progress related to reform of the security sector and the confidence of the local population in the ability of the police and the judiciary to enforce the rule of law. Serious concern was expressed to OIOS, both in interviews and during the staff survey, that efforts in this area have not had sufficient effect to permit sustainability in the long run.

38. *UNMIL commented that its goal is not an overarching framework; rather, it is aiming for targeted, coordinated strategies with clearly defined linkages, as exemplified at the Partners Forum held in September 2009.*

39. OIOS found that, while UNMIL, other United Nations entities and Member States have sought to address separately most of the components related to security sector reform, no comprehensive strategy links those reform efforts in the areas of defence and the police or in the areas of the judiciary and corrections.

40. The lack of an overarching strategy is evident in the efforts undertaken by various actors outside and within UNMIL. The Legal and Judicial System Support Division, the corrections and prison advisory services, and the Police Commissioner

report to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Rule of Law and address reform of the judiciary, reform of the corrections institutions and reform of the Liberian National Police, respectively. The Civil Affairs Section reports to the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Recovery and Governance and works to build capacity and to consolidate the State institutions, such as the Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, that are responsible for overseeing the security institutions. OIOS learned that, while those components of the Mission collaborate on certain issues, their work is not adequately integrated.

41. OIOS noted a greater focus on and the early prioritization of reform of the police and armed forces. While other aspects of security sector reform have been factored into planning, wide discrepancies in terms of emphasis and outcome remain. For example, the police captured suspected criminals at a faster rate than the judicial and corrections institutions could manage, resulting in overcrowded prisons and failure to meet human rights requirements, including the right to a timely trial. Without an overarching strategy, UNMIL cannot present a thorough security sector reform plan that both attracts and helps to coordinate donor support for all relevant areas of such reform. The Mission's transition and exit strategies depend on Liberia being able to provide for its own security.

42. *With regard to the aforementioned issue, UNMIL commented that, while early donor prioritization is not forthcoming in all areas, the Mission has always identified the interlinkages among all components. In the case of the rule of law, there is no simple, direct causality between results and early prioritization or between lack of results and lack of early prioritization, and the challenges faced in the area of the rule of law are complex, involving many stakeholders. While agreeing with the Mission's comments, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations noted that the point made by OIOS is valid.*

43. OIOS concludes that it is important that UNMIL develop an integrated strategy for the coordination of security sector reform in Liberia. Such a strategy should include, in particular, the areas of defence, the police, the judiciary and corrections. Devising such a strategy will require the engagement of all partners involved in those areas. Furthermore, data collected during the present evaluation and similar evaluations conducted by OIOS support the finding that the lack of a coherent security sector reform strategy is a problem not only in the case of UNMIL, but in many missions, and should be addressed at both the field and headquarters levels.<sup>4</sup>

## **E. Support for the implementation of the peace process**

### **5. UNMIL has contributed effectively to the implementation of the peace process, but significant challenges remain**

44. The peace process mandate comprises several elements, including helping the Government of Liberia to re-establish national authority throughout the country and developing a strategy for the consolidation of national institutions. The mandate also includes assisting the Government in restoring the proper management of natural resources. OIOS found that, in general, progress in consolidating State authority

<sup>4</sup> A similar lack of an integrated and overarching strategy for security sector reform is noted in the programme evaluation of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (A/63/713).

throughout Liberia has been slow and is hampered by challenges pre-dating the conflict, as well as by the limited operational capacity of the Government owing to the need to rebuild the State apparatus. The Mission's mandate to support the peace process received a favourable rating in the staff survey; there is high confidence among staff that the mandate will be fulfilled soon after the 2011 elections.

45. UNMIL has taken a range of measures to aid in the establishment of national authority and functional administrative structures throughout the country. Much of this work has been aimed at improving the visibility and presence of the Government at the local level. Examples include using quick-impact project funds to construct local bank payment centres so as to ensure the regular and timely payment of salaries to civil servants in the counties; providing logistical support, including by transporting Government officials and civil servants to their respective duty stations in the counties; and quick-impact projects aimed at rehabilitating public facilities and repairing roads and bridges.

46. The county support teams, a joint undertaking of UNMIL and the United Nations country team, bring together the entire United Nations presence in Liberia, other international partners and local authorities to facilitate community recovery and development in accordance with national priorities. In addition to serving as a coordination mechanism, the county support teams are provided with funds for projects, covering infrastructure, training and information management, that are administered by UNDP and implemented by the Mission. Both interview data and a joint study by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP suggest that the county support teams have been an instrumental tool in supporting integrated approaches and coherent coordination. The success of the teams is now considered a best practice within the Department and the Programme. OIOS regards the establishment of the joint teams as an important and innovative tool in attaining the objectives of the mandate.

47. As regards the mandate to develop a strategy for the consolidation of national institutions, including a legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions, OIOS acknowledges the assistance provided by UNMIL, but also recognizes the limitations of the outcomes achieved. Interviews with Mission stakeholders and partners confirm that UNMIL has made good efforts in implementing the mandate, in an advisory capacity. These include, inter alia, monitoring, reporting on and evaluating judicial and corrections procedures nationwide and preparing analytical reports disseminated to national partners and donors.

48. During interviews, United Nations staff acknowledged that, on the whole, UNMIL has met considerable challenges in strengthening the rule-of-law sector. Data reviewed by OIOS show that, while indicators of achievement concern mainly tangibles such as the rehabilitation of prisons, the reopening of courts and the mentoring and training of corrections staff, work at the institutional level has been very slow.

49. The mandate of UNMIL includes playing a supporting role in the Government's efforts to restore the proper management of natural resources. After reviewing documents and information collected during interviews, OIOS concluded that UNMIL has fulfilled its mandate in the past by carrying out site visits to investigate, monitor and report on compliance with sanctions regulating the management of natural resources. The Mission has also provided advice and technical assistance regarding international environmental standards, the

management of natural resources and the development of a national regulatory framework for the utilization and protection of such resources, including timber, rubber and diamonds. A positive assessment of the assistance provided by UNMIL is confirmed by the lifting of the sanctions related to diamonds and timber and the introduction of the Kimberley Process in Liberia.

## **F. Assisting the Government of Liberia with the 2011 elections**

### **6. The Mission's support for the 2005 presidential elections was considered essential, and lessons learned there will be important in terms of its support for the 2011 elections**

50. Under Security Council resolution 1885 (2009), UNMIL is also mandated with assisting the Government with the 2011 general presidential and legislative elections. OIOS noted that the conduct of the 2005 presidential elections was an essential component in consolidating the peace process in Liberia. The Mission collaborated with the Transitional National Government and international agencies in preparing for voter registration and an election action plan, conducting public information and awareness-raising campaigns aimed at increasing women's participation, training election staff and managing logistical and administrative issues, as well as planning and coordinating security measures. The population survey indicated that the outcome of those activities was positive: 74 per cent of respondents stated that they perceived the elections as having been free and fair. The elections were held within the established time frame and were conducted in a secure, non-violent environment. The success of the elections is further confirmed by an independent assessment. The support provided by UNMIL, in particular its logistical support for the elections, was considered crucial.

51. With regard to the upcoming elections, the Mission's mandate is limited to providing logistical support to the National Elections Commission to cover gaps in national capacities. It is important that UNMIL be mindful of the 2005 experience when assisting the Commission. OIOS found that there is little institutional awareness within UNMIL of documented lessons learned from the 2005 elections. In addition to more recent lessons reported in relation to the 2009 bi-elections, older lessons such as those detailed in the UNMIL Force headquarters report on the Liberian elections could assist in informing 2011 strategies.

52. *Concerning elections, UNMIL commented that its support was not limited entirely to logistics. Security Council resolution 1885 (2009) authorizes the Mission to assist the Government of Liberia with the 2011 general presidential and legislative elections, by providing logistical support, particularly to facilitate access to remote areas, coordinating international electoral assistance, and supporting Liberian institutions and political parties in creating an atmosphere conducive to the conduct of peaceful elections.*

## **G. Cross-cutting areas — gender and public information**

### **7. UNMIL has had some success in mainstreaming gender issues into its operations, but sexual exploitation and abuse remains a problem**

53. In interviews, UNMIL staff expressed the view that progress has been made in integrating gender into the Mission's agenda and tasks, which is specifically mentioned in its mandate. That opinion is supported by documentation and the results of the staff survey. With regard to gender mainstreaming, 97 per cent of staff felt that at least some degree of it was occurring within the Mission. UNMIL has developed an action plan for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), on women and peace and security. OIOS learned that the Office of the Gender Adviser is playing an active role in raising the awareness of Mission staff about the importance of gender.<sup>5</sup> However, views expressed within UNMIL, as well as external assessments, suggest that the Office faces difficulties in mainstreaming gender-awareness approaches at the section level, where relevant issues arise. There is a tendency on the part of sections to leave gender issues for the Office of the Gender Adviser to address, rather than taking on such work by themselves. This suggests a lack of understanding within the Mission, particularly at the lower operational levels, regarding the role of the Office and the importance of gender mainstreaming.

54. In view of the Organization's zero-tolerance policy concerning sexual exploitation and abuse, OIOS noted that cases involving sexual exploitation and abuse present an ongoing challenge within UNMIL. In other respects a mission well received by the local population, as indicated by the population survey, UNMIL continues to have such cases. According to statistics of both the OIOS Investigations Division and the Headquarters Conduct and Discipline Unit, the Mission is now second only to the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in terms of both number of allegations involving sexual exploitation and abuse and number of such allegations involving minors.<sup>6</sup> However, only 2.7 per cent of respondents to the staff survey indicated that sexual exploitation and abuse was a major challenge for UNMIL, and only 1.2 per cent identified ending sexual exploitation and abuse as the change needed.<sup>7</sup> Like other missions, UNMIL has a Conduct and Discipline Team working on issues in this area. Since 2007, the Team has employed a female consultant to raise the awareness of communities near UNMIL deployments regarding acts of sexual exploitation and abuse and appropriate reporting channels. In the light of the increased number of reports concerning violations involving sexual exploitation and abuse, the effort appears to have been successful in addressing the underreporting of such cases that had previously been prevalent.

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<sup>5</sup> See multi-donor review of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) by the United Nations missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Kosovo.

<sup>6</sup> See <http://cdu.unlb.org/Statistics/OverviewofStatistics.aspx>.

<sup>7</sup> See S/2007/479 and S/2006/743.

**8. UNMIL has an effective public information programme, including in particular its public radio programme**

55. On the basis of interviews with stakeholders and partners, as well as the results of the population survey, OIOS also concluded that UNMIL is effective in the area of public information, promoting an understanding of the peace process and of its mandate among the political parties and the general population. In particular, UNMIL radio was referred to positively in both interviews and surveys, although a few respondents to the staff survey stated that the Mission needed to further advertise its efforts to the local population. UNMIL radio had a wide listening audience among the respondents to the population survey. Approximately three quarters of respondents indicated that they had listened to it, with 89 per cent of these stating that they did so every day or a few times a week (the percentage was split relatively evenly between the two responses). The results of the population survey showed similar positive attitudes towards the Mission's role in the peace process, regardless of whether respondents belonged to a community that had received an UNMIL deployment, and regardless of their proximity to the Mission.

**H. Integrated strategic planning**

**9. The Mission's integrated strategic planning approach facilitates coherent action, and effective strategic partnership, with the United Nations country team towards mandate implementation**

56. The first overarching strategic framework of UNMIL was the integrated mission priorities and implementation plan, formulated in 2006. The United Nations country team was extensively consulted in the development of the plan, which included an inventory of country team activities, but its substantive participation was limited, and it had no implementation role. OIOS noted that most of the Mission's planning in this regard was undertaken section by section. The plan was developed from the bottom up, with the section workplans compiled into a loose, overarching framework. The extent of the country team's involvement in drafting the workplans varied from section to section. The plan became the cornerstone of the Mission's implementation of the integrated mission planning process. The new Government of Liberia, installed early in 2006, had begun to draft an interim poverty reduction strategy, and the plan was aligned with the priorities set out in the strategy.

57. Interviews indicate that integrated strategic planning between UNMIL and the United Nations country team remained fairly limited between 2003 and 2005. By the time of the development of the 2008-2012 United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), this had changed, and the endeavour was undertaken jointly, with participation by the country team, the Government of Liberia and UNMIL. The plan remained in place until 2008, when it was largely replaced by the Framework.

58. The United Nations Development Assistance Framework is the integrated strategic framework currently used by the entire United Nations presence in Liberia. It was devised as a formal United Nations response to the priorities outlined by the Government of Liberia in the interim and is fully aligned with the Government's poverty reduction strategy. It focuses on how the United Nations in Liberia is to support national recovery and development until 2012, and its outcome areas

correspond to the five pillars (peace and security, economic revitalization, governance and the rule of law, infrastructure and social services and HIV and AIDS) and the time frame of the strategy. In order to facilitate the achievement of each outcome set out in the Framework, Outcome Groups — representing United Nations country team agencies and UNMIL sections — have been formed at the working level.

59. During the course of the evaluation, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations developed integrated mission planning process guidelines for the role of United Nations field presences in integrated planning.<sup>8</sup> The guidelines provide advice on integrated strategic planning for United Nations field presences that include both a peacekeeping mission or political office and a country team. OIOS found that the United Nations in Liberia already has the integrated field coordination structures urged in the guidelines and that Liberia is cited as a model in the guidelines. The Office noted that the UNMIL model — specifically, its establishment of a Strategic Planning Group chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and consisting of mission leadership, most section chiefs and heads of the country team, instead of the working-level integrated mission planning team called for in the 2006 guidelines — is considered a best practice and contributed to the improvements made in the 2009 guidelines.

60. Under the new guidelines, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has made efforts to move beyond the limited integrated mission plans to request integrated strategic frameworks, which include country team activities, in order to promote what it calls “strategic partnerships”. Having reviewed the United Nations Development Assistance Framework as well as the recommendations concerning the integrated strategic frameworks, OIOS noted that the Liberia Framework fulfils the purpose of the strategic frameworks in bringing together the United Nations in Liberia around a set of agreed priorities aligned with the priorities of the Government of Liberia, ensuring Liberian ownership of United Nations efforts. Interviews with UNMIL as well as its partners confirmed the assessment by the Office that the Liberia Framework is an integrated strategic plan based on a shared view of effective partnership among various United Nations entities, with none of them taking precedence over another. OIOS noted that the Framework serves as a clear, effective link between security and development, as well as between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

61. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has informed OIOS that the integrated mission task force for Liberia formally endorsed the United Nations Development Assistance Framework as the integrated strategic framework in Liberia on 29 January 2010.*

62. OIOS found that UNMIL deviates from the recommendations of the integrated mission planning process in that it lacks an officially dedicated civilian planning capacity. The United Nations country team has dedicated strategic planning staff in the Integrated Office of the Resident Coordinator, and unofficial planning capacities within the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General have worked with the Integrated Office on planning issues. Both the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Mission have pointed out that the appointment of

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<sup>8</sup> The guidelines have been submitted for endorsement. Once endorsed and agreed upon by senior managers of the Department, they will be distributed to the field.

dedicated UNMIL planning capacities might be required in order to manage the Mission's transition phase.

## **I. Coordination and integration in programme implementation**

### **10. UNMIL is a good example of the integrated missions concept and has, together with the United Nations country team, gone far in achieving a “One United Nations” approach**

63. The majority of the stakeholders and partners of UNMIL, and of the United Nations in Liberia as a whole, have commended the Mission and the United Nations country team for the progress made in working together for greater effectiveness in Liberia. OIOS found that, in addition to integration having been achieved through formal planning, a range of mechanisms have been applied to facilitate joint action and implementation. Many of these are considered innovative and may be adaptable for application elsewhere. Specific achievements include the implementation of the integrated mission concept at the field level through the integration of the functions of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator with those of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, as well as the development of an integrated field coordination structure regarded by many as highly effective and perceived to be a ground-breaking model for joint approaches at various levels.

64. The structure includes regular senior-level meetings, such as the biweekly meetings of the Strategic Planning Group and the Security Management Team; joint United Nations Development Assistance Framework Outcome Groups, aligned with the pillars of the Framework; and thematic and functional groups for joint efforts in such areas as gender and public information. In addition, the United Nations in Liberia has adopted a unique field-office structure that includes both the aforementioned county support teams and the establishment of joint United Nations offices at two locations, in Lofa and Grand Gedeh counties. Furthermore, the United Nations in Liberia is undertaking a range of joint programmes, for example, vaccination campaigns and campaigns against sexual exploitation and abuse.

65. OIOS found that all of these structures and functions are bolstered by a mindset shared among staff, prevalent in both UNMIL and the United Nations country team, that supports working together. Throughout interviews, this was commonly attributed to a general understanding of the security-development nexus and the relationship between peacebuilding and peacekeeping, facilitated by the leadership of the current and the previous special representatives, as well as by the Deputy Special Representative/Resident Coordinator function.

66. While a system has been put in place whereby UNMIL supplies fuel to the entire United Nations presence and each agency registers and pays for its own fuel use, the same cannot be done for vehicle spare parts, for example, owing to the variety of vehicles used across the United Nations system. Similarly, the Mission provides Internet access to the entire joint offices structure, but the various agencies rely on different types of Internet and e-mail systems, which sometimes impedes access to information. A case in point is the web application for the integrated mission priorities and implementation plan. The plan had been intended to be placed on the web so that it could be edited by implementing partners as work progressed. The web application was never launched, owing to technical difficulties, one of

which was the inability of country team programme managers to gain access to the UNMIL server. Thus, harmonizing the use of resources is still in the nascent stages. The problems arising with regard to who should pay for the cleaning of a joint office is a simple but good example.

## **J. Exit strategy planning**

### **11. UNMIL has clear, specific benchmarks measuring the progress of the Mission and pacing its exit strategy**

67. UNMIL has developed consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal benchmarks as an important part of its strategic planning. The benchmarks were developed for the Mission's consolidation phase (2006-2007) and its drawdown phase (2008-2011). OIOS noted that the development of the consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal benchmarks is an essential part of the Mission's exit strategy. The benchmarks have been linked to the guidelines for the integrated mission priorities and implementation plan and the integrated mission planning process, and they are also aligned with the more recently developed "capstone doctrine", set out in the 2008 document of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support entitled "United Nations peacekeeping operations: principles and guidelines". The consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal benchmarks have continued to build on local ownership, facilitating the integrated assessment of Mission progress on the basis of the Government's four-pillar strategy. The benchmarks have been shared with both the Government of Liberia and the Security Council to aid in the assessment of Liberia's progress. Dividing the benchmarks into "core" (security-related) and "contextual" benchmarks, the consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal framework not only guides the Council with regard to the security-related achievements of UNMIL, but also provides linkages between the Mission's mandate and longer-term peacebuilding. The framework reflects the Mission's transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding, taking into account the capacities of Government institutions, and is thus a critical tool in advancing transition planning. Recently, a "stop-light" reporting format was developed to assist in monitoring progress on and revising the consolidation, drawdown and withdrawal framework. OIOS found it to be a useful format for UNMIL that might serve other missions in planning their exit strategies.

## **V. Conclusions**

68. OIOS concludes that UNMIL has achieved substantial progress in implementing its mandate, but weak implementation of reform in the security sector poses a risk to sustained peace and security in Liberia. The Mission's effective support for the ceasefire, including disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation, has contributed to the implementation of not only the Security Council mandate, leading to the successful 2005 elections, but also the mandates of other United Nations actors in Liberia. The presence of UNMIL has helped to create an enabling security environment in which a range of peacebuilding activities carried out by UNMIL and other actors have been possible. Nonetheless, a number of serious challenges remain before the mandate can be regarded as having been

completed. There are still large gaps in the implementation of reform of the national police and in the consolidation of rule-of-law institutions.

69. The capacity of Liberian institutions to cope with residual drivers of conflict is still not strong enough to permit a withdrawal of the Mission without risking a relapse into conflict. In particular, further progress in security sector reform is needed to ensure that an exploitable security vacuum will not be created before the Mission withdraws. In general, the lack of a comprehensive and overarching strategy on the part of UNMIL and other partners for the implementation of such reform has contributed to slow progress in this area.

70. *UNMIL commented that it places great emphasis on coordinated, comprehensive security sector reform in Liberia. The Mission also drew the attention of OIOS to paragraph 26 of the special report of the Secretary-General on UNMIL (S/2009/299) dated 10 June 2009: "At the Mission's request, the United Kingdom agreed to fund a security sector reform adviser to my Special Representative for Liberia, Ellen Margrethe Løj. However, that assistance will expire in October 2009. In view of the need to continue to pursue a comprehensive approach to security sector reform, the Mission recommended that all options be considered with a view to the retention of that post in UNMIL." The Department of Peacekeeping Operations agreed with the Mission's comments and observed that it has consistently advocated dedicated security sector reform in UNMIL, which would, inter alia, focus the attention of all actors on that area, including the specific issues and gaps identified in the present report.*

71. OIOS also concludes that, even though there remain challenges to the implementation of its mandate, UNMIL has adopted an innovative attitude towards working with the United Nations country team that has enabled the Mission to have greater impact in Liberia. In addition, collaboration seems to have bolstered the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire United Nations presence in Liberia in delivering on its mandates. In many ways, UNMIL has set a precedent for other missions in working together with the country team. In general, OIOS found UNMIL to have been inventive in working towards a "One United Nations" approach.

## VI. Recommendations

72. On the basis of the evaluation findings set out in the present report, OIOS makes the following 12 recommendations.

### **Recommendation 1**

73. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should consider conducting a more in-depth examination of the consequences and outcomes of the closure of the Liberian office of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs vis-à-vis the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in Liberia since 2004, in order to identify best practices and lessons learned that can inform future missions. The Department may also consider undertaking such an examination jointly with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (see para. 26).

74. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that it does not agree that the implementation of the aforementioned recommendation would have added*

*value, particularly since several such reviews were conducted by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and independent institutions shortly after the closure of the Liberian office. The Department added that, in its view, should the recommendation remain, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs should lead the assessment.*

75. In the light of the recent experience in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, OIOS maintains that a joint evaluation should be conducted by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

### **Recommendation 2**

76. UNMIL, in conjunction with ECOWAS and the Government of Liberia, should carry out a security threat assessment, followed by a needs assessment and the development of a strategy for addressing these needs, to be used as the basis for an informed exit strategy that will prevent the creation of a security vacuum after the Mission has been downsized (see para. 31).

### **Recommendation 3**

77. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should strengthen the Mission's United Nations police capacity by making available advanced and specialized police capacities in such areas as forensics, strategic planning and management, together with civilian capacities in such areas as logistical support management, accountancy and audit, to enable the Mission to fulfil its United Nations police mandate (see para. 33).

*78. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations agreed with the aforementioned recommendation, while noting that this is a challenge for all peacekeeping missions. Furthermore, in December 2009 the Department's Police Division sent a letter to all UNMIL police-contributing countries specifying the specific skill set required for the Mission, and also raised the level of the minimum selection criteria.*

### **Recommendation 4**

79. UNMIL should strengthen its delivery of training to the Liberian National Police by shifting the main focus from training patrol officers to training officers in middle and senior management, in order to ensure a better-functioning force. Greater attention should be paid to the qualitative aspects of the training, including management issues (see para. 34).

*80. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations agreed with the aforementioned recommendation, while noting that the Inspector General of the Liberian National Police is trying to put in place measures to address the fact that many police managers (political appointees) have not been properly trained. Managerial courses are provided at the National Police Training Academy, and bilateral partners, including the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France and Sweden, have also provided training courses for mid- and senior-level officers.*

### **Recommendation 5**

81. UNMIL should consider reorganizing its United Nations police and revising its standard operating procedures so that most units are restructured to play advisory

roles with regard to the Liberian National Police. UNMIL should ensure that the structure of its United Nations police corresponds to that of Liberian National Police senior management, so that appropriate advisory roles can be ensured and high-level United Nations police officers can be assigned to advise relevant deputy police commissioners and senior officers of the Liberian National Police (see para. 35).

82. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations noted that the aforementioned recommendation has already been implemented, as the revised concept of operations for the United Nations police is near finalization.*

#### **Recommendation 6**

83. UNMIL, in close consultation with the United Nations country team, Member States and the Government of Liberia, should consider developing an overarching strategy for security sector reform that links in particular reform of the defence sector with that of the national police and of the judicial and corrections systems. Such a strategy should take into account the Mission's drawdown phase, addressing reform components that will be managed both before and after the Mission withdraws (see para. 43).

84. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations agreed with the aforementioned recommendation, but noted that the present report does not reflect the fact that the Government of Liberia stopped the recruitment of corrections personnel after the first two courses, owing to a lack of sufficient resources to pay salaries. The report also makes no mention of the efforts made thus far in the area of corrections, such as the Peacebuilding Fund projects under way and the project proposal developed with a view to building infrastructure and capacity. In addition, it does not mention the strategic plan for the corrections sector that has been developed and approved by the Government.*

#### **Recommendation 7**

85. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should, where applicable and appropriate, consider employing in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions variations on the model of the county support team as utilized in Liberia. Given the uniqueness of each situation, the Liberian model can be shared with mission leaders in other countries, who can decide whether the use of a similar structure would be appropriate (see para. 46).

#### **Recommendation 8**

86. UNMIL should intensify political dialogue with the Government of Liberia with a view to developing strategies for accelerating national legal reform and implementing the strategic plans for the rule-of-law sector (see para. 47).

#### **Recommendation 9**

87. UNMIL should ensure the adoption of adequate strategies in helping the National Elections Commission to prepare for the upcoming elections in the areas of advance logistical planning and establishing proper procedures and rehearsals, including by drawing on lessons learned from past electoral practices (see para. 51).

**Recommendation 10**

88. The United Nations in Liberia should consider adapting the United Nations Development Assistance Framework in the light of the new requirements of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, so that it can be adopted as the Mission's functional integrated strategic frameworks. Throughout such a process, UNMIL should ensure that its strategic partnership with the country team remains fair and strong (see para. 60).

89. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that the aforementioned recommendation was implemented and endorsed by all United Nations agencies participating in the integrated mission task force for Liberia, on 29 January 2010.*

**Recommendation 11**

90. In line with Department of Peacekeeping Operations guidelines, UNMIL should appoint dedicated civilian planning capacities to facilitate its exit and transition phases. To that end, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia may consider establishing an integrated analytical and planning team by integrating the planning capacity of UNMIL with that of the United Nations country team (see para. 62).

**Recommendation 12**

91. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support should work in collaboration with various United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to overcome the administrative challenges identified within missions as hampering true integration in the field (see para. 66).

(Signed) Inga-Britt Ahlenius  
Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services

16 March 2010

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